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THE ECONOMICS OF TOTAL WARFARE
By A. A. MAGNUS
The rrreater part of the populalion of our planet is at pruem livi1&g under
condition8 of tou.l warfare. Every day they ezpenence ita conlleque'ncea, yet prob.
ably few /kwe reflected on what thia meana to 1M atructure of ecollomic thought.
Dr. Magllu8, whom our readera know from hia comributiona "Three Gonceptionll of
Ecollomica" (July 1942) and "Japan Fina.tlCu 1M War" (October 1942), has in
tile following article tried to form a coherem theory of economica as they a're
emeryi11g in total warfort in all participa/;ing countriu. In doing this M has, for
tile Bake of simplicity, cOllce,urated enlirely on the /JCcmomic side, purpoaely omitting
the implicaticnla of tQtal war to be fo'und in the apir'itual or political apheru.-K.M.
MAN must be fed, housed, andclothed. For this purpose hemust work and have the material
with which to work. Work and material
must he properly co-ordinated. Man co-
ordinates them by budgeting. The study
of how in the course of history man has
shaped his budget and how in any given
circumstances he can theoretically shape
his budget, is the science of national
economy or, if you prefer, social economy.
Both these terms represent a wealth of
thought and scientific dispute, which
latter is entirely justified in view of the
complexity of the subject matter. With-
out touching upon such controversies,
we shall attempt to study the essential
economics of total warfare.
Let us take an exampIe of actual
economics. The teacher performs work
by passing on knowledge to the student.
The student works in the afternoons in
the office of a manufacturer of chemical
fertilizers. In this way he completes his
budget for his living expenses at the
university, since the monthly allowance
from his father, a manufacturer of bicycle
lamps, is insufficient. The fertilizer fa.c-
tory supplies chemical fertilizers to the
farmer. The farmer supplies wheat to
the grain dealer. The grain dealer sup-
plies it to the flour mill. The mill sup-
plies flour to the baker. The baker
supplies bread to the tea.cher. This is
only one of the countless circles that go
tu make up economics.
DEMAND-THE DRIVING FORCE
The example just used shows the
possible contributions of individual eco-
nomic subjects a.ccording to their ca-
pabilities. But the transition from one
step to the next is by no means hard
and fast. The baker could just as well
supply his bread only to soldiers, and the
teacher would be left empty-handed.
The links of the chain appear firmer
when, instead of following the circle of
supply, we follow that of demand. The
teacher needs bread to be able to work.
The baker needs flour to carryon his
trade. The mill needs the grain, the
farmer the fertilizer, the fertilizer factory
the student, and the student the teacher.
Thus demand, or the consumer, is the
a.ctual driving force of economics.
Now there are various ways in which
the driving forces can be co-ordinated.
The individual consumers can be in-
dependent in their budget and work and
voluntarily co-ordinate themselves. For
instance, the baker calculates that he has
to supply so and 80 many loaves in order
to be able to support his family out of
the profits; at the same time he calculates
how many loaves he would be able to
sell as a result of his skill in organizing.
The quantity of flour which he must
obtain is somewhere between this mini-
mum and maximum. This type of eco-
nomics is called in theory "free com-
merce." It is actua.lly an extreme, inas-
much as it represents the one extreme of
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a variable quantity. For the degree of
independence is variable. The individual
may strive to be as independent as pos-
sible; but, because of the difficulties of
human communal life, he will always be
limited in one way or another by control
on the part of the authorities.
BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES
In studying the possibilities of such
control, we arrive at the other extreme
of the various forms of economics, which
we may call "centralized economics."
In a centralized economy in its most
extreme form, there is no room for in-
dependent budgeting. From the topmost
organ of planning down to our baker, all
economic activities run according to fixed
rules. The baker has to buy so and so
much flour and must deliver bread to so
and so many customers. He must make
a fixed profit which enables him to obtain
fixed quantities of food, living quarters,
and clothing to take care of the needs of
his family budget.
Actually, however, the economic order
in the various budgets within a nation is
directed either more toward free com-
merce or toward centralized economics.
In total warfare, the tendency is toward
the latter; in peace time toward the
former.
But before we go into this in more
detail we must touch upon a technical
question. How does the consumer dis-
tribute his requirements, and how does
he obtain the fruits of his labors so that
he can be a consumer? The fact that
direct barter is possible has been shown
at the peak of inflation times, when
money had lost its function as a standard
of values. This condition is hardly ideal,
for very often it is impossible properly
to divide the goods to be bartered. That
which represents the standard of values
and makes a proper division possible is
in normal modern times money. Mo~ey
is a means of communication, just like
ra.ilways, shipping, teletype machines,
and short-wave telephones. For steamers
.and trains to move, there must be steam
in the boilers; for telephones and short-
wa\'e radios to function, they must be
supplied with electric current. For
money to be able to circulate, there
must be a corresponding supply of goods
wherever the currency is valid. In the
same way, the functioning of all these
means of communication is dependent
on the existence of other technical ap-
pliances such as safety valves and fuses.
THE DEMANDS OF DEFENSE
SO far we have limited ourselves to
discussing the supply of goods of daily
consumption. However, there also exists
a second large circle of demand, equal in
importance to the first one, arising from
the fact that human beings are constantly
threatened by each other. Hence they
have combined into clans, tribes, nations,
and still larger aLlia.nces. The size of
these combinations depends on the tech-
nical development of the means of defense.
Man can no longer provide alone for the
necessary means of defending himself.
The age of the stone ax is past, and since
man has left the jungle and has taken
up agriculture and cattle-raising he has
been forced to rely on units larger than
the family, in other words on the com-
munity.
The organization of defense has always
been the state's most important task,
and its political and economic organiza-
tion is determined by the requirements of
defense. Thus the feudal system of the
European Middle Ages or of the Tokugawa
Shogunate corresponded to the pos-
sibilities offered by those times for ensur-
ing defense and feeding of the population.
The mercenary system of Europe in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was
closely connected with the invention of
gunpowder and the mercantile system.
In view of the improvement of the manu-
facture of arms, the next step was due
chiefly to the capitalistic system of pro-
duction, which permitted the manu-
facture of such quantities of arms that
it was no longer possible to pay for
enough mercenaries to carry them. The
result was general conscription. The
method of defense of a vast naval power
makes possible still another form of
economics.
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. Th ·latest arlvancement of technology
is chara t rized b th ext nsion of the
field of battle by anot,her dimension. the
air and by the increa in the production
of tee I which ha enabled the large- cale
empl ment f tank. One might also
summarize tills advancement as the com-
bu tion-engine age f war. ] n thi. age,
material play. a role of incr using im-
portance, which in turn nece itates a
growing numb l' of laborers to produce
this material. The con equence is that
the laborer has been placed on an equal
footing with the soldier as a combatant.
This form of war was named 'total war"
by a. military writer shortly after the
Creat War.
WAR AND EMPLOYMENT
Eyen in time of peace, the supply of
consunlers' goods is influenced by the
safeguarding of the means of defense.
How then, is consumption affected by
the burden of ensuring this defense?
We can deal with this que tion either
from the viewpoint of the budget of the
entire nation or from that of the individual
budget of each mem bel' of the nation.
The development of the budget of Japan
from 1931 to 1942, wruch we hu\'e dis-
cu ed in detail in our article "Japan
Finance the War" appearing in the
Octob·r 1942 i ue of this magazine,
furnishes an excellent example of the
former, i.e., a national budget. Hence we
shl~ll procecd at once to the study of the
effect of war and war pI' paratioilll on the
budget of the individual.
How does war affect employment? To
return to ur manufacturer of bicycle
.lamps: after the outbrenk of war, he
ha adju -ted his producti n to t·he manu-
facture of searchlight. Not only ha.s he
been able to keep rno t of his workers:
he ven employs thr e time' as many as
before. Where do the workers come
from? 1"1'001 some metal works or other
which hitherto produced for export and
wero not able to readju t themselve in
time, or from workshops hitherto pro-
du ing luxury goods. But i it so easy
to obtain workers?
When war breaks out, war orders in-
rea and) icld profits wru h fall like
spring rain onto the economic system of
a country. -'omo of he profit: ar u cd
to expand war-important plants; but
other mi ht be u ed, for instan 'e, to
purcbu!'le a hotel and to 'xpand it.
Our bicycle-lamp ma.nufactur l' wiu at
any rate incr ase hi son's allowance 0
that the latter will give up rus job at the
office of the fer ilizer factory in order
to devote himself entirely to his tudios
or to join the Army. The fertilizer factory
in turn must look for a successor. While
some of the workers are cons riptod into
the army and are thus eliminated from the
process of production, the demand for
labor rises. This ituatiOll might lead to
difficultie if there were ufficient mw
material to maintain full production.
Most countrie , however, are forced to
curtail many proc es if only becnu e of
a shortage of raw materials, which in
turn rele e worker. In England, for
instance, there was. considerable uu-
employment in 1939/40 for this very
reason.
In view of the vast number of read-
ju tm nt , it i difficult for the individual
manufacturer to gain a clear idea of the
labor market. Con. equently, all produc-
ers in posse sion of raw rnaterial try
desperately to attract worker ev n at
increa 'ed wag . Thus, in order to pre-
vent production nonessential to war and
to stabilize wages, even the OlO·t liberal
cOlUltry is obliged to tak re our e to
regulating th lauor market. Germany
had a considerable advantage over other'
countries in tills respect, for she had
already carried out a regulation of the
labor market to combat unemployment,
and tills system could imply carryon.
Moreover, all nece ary preparations for
tho eventuality of war had beon made,
so that the outbidding of wages that
occurred in America was impo. ible in
Germany.
Japan was in this respect in a omewhut
different position. She had had tho
advantage that, starting from 1937. she
could very gradually adju t her peace-
time industry to war requirements. The
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export indu try Wfi:-i already at a stand-
till amI .. upplied the workers needed by
the expandill~ armament industry. But
ven ~o there WIlS a demand f l' labor,
and wage gnu:lually increLLsed.
RJ::\"I ED TUEORIES
There is 1\ psychological factor whose
influence on the increasing demand for
labor mu·t not be uJHlelTated. Many
social economists presti ppose that man
in tinctively works at that plnce where,
with -qual conditi ns. he will earn the
highest income. Hence they believe that,
where mol' money can be made, more
work wiJI be done. There seems to be a
different rule, however-chiefly in hot cli-
mate -something to the following effect.
If a man can, as a result of increased
wages, ~atisfy his regtLlur requirements
by working horter hours, he has more
free time to enjoy himself or to rest.
Why, then, work more, or why go reg-
uJarly to the factory, especially when
there nre less and leI'S good to be bought?
To work hard in order to buy savings
bonds is a rather remote idea for people
who have little sense of time and n.re
not much accu tomed to thinking in
terms of the future.
L<:-t u - digre here slightly. During
the economic world crisis, the price of
raw rubber dropped to one third of its
level prior to 1920. The rubber market
collap. ed, and the Dutch East Indies
studied the po sibility of regulating pro-
ductiou in order to stabilize the rubber
price. The result was the following dis-
crepa.ncy. Tho plantation owners in-
creased production when prices rose and
curtailed production when prices fell.
The natives, however, who tapped the
rubber in the jungle increased production
when prices fell, for that was the only
way of obtaining the money they were
accustomed to spending. On the other
hand, they decre< ed production when
prices rose.
The rubber plan had to be based on
these ontradictory attitudes. Both
groups acted from selfish motives, but
the problem was not to be 80lved by
simply adju ting prices. Classic economic
theory reckons with self-interest as with
a natural force. It cannot be blamed for
this, for it was faced by a plethora of
economic okervatiun.. alld sought for
some principle to exphLin human actions
and to make them cal-·ulable. In the
two hundred year~ I'lincc Adam 'mith's
time, doubts have arisen as to the general
ndidity of elf-ultere ·t, as an explanatory
principle. \\'e do not know y t where
the theory of "common intere t goes
before self-intere t" may lead u a a
new explanatory principle of correct
nutiollu.1 economy. But one thing is
certain: with the present dense p pulation
of the earth and at the present level of
technical knowledcr(' ungoverned self-
interest leads to u·h di~llster' of over-
production that public interest, represent-
illg common illtere. t, will alway' have to
intervene.
To direct war economics by means of
. elf-interest i a hopele... task, as oon
u.s even a single opponent--such as now
the Russians-work on another principle.
1t remains to be seen how long t,he
United Stat,e will be able to organize
em ployment on the ba!o:is of income.
When the point is finally reached at
which lIot enough people ure prepared to
work becau e money no longer attracts
them, only such pOHsibilities remain as
the mobilization of moral forces or even
compulsion.
EFFECTS OF TOTAL MOBlLIZATION
At the beginning of HJ4:311. new phenom-
enon of total warfare made its appear-
ance in Germany. Unti.l then it had
been sufficient to have wn.r-essential
workers on n. combatant footing. Now,
however, it became nccessarv to take
people away from jobs which h~d hitherto
been regarded as war-e..sential. Our
baker, for eXtLmple, who supplied the
teacher, may have had a comparatively
old-fa,'>hioned bakery where fiU h of the
work was done by hand. During the
period of unelll ployment tllis had actually
been an advantage; but now the baker
had to close down, and the teacher 8
bread was supplied by a huge bread
factory where everything is mechanized.
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The baker is now employed in an am-
munition factory or in an airplane-
assembly plant, while his former employees
are now soldiers.
How is the problem of wages handled
in tills case? Many, many small factory
owners, tradesmen, and artisans all over
the world are sacrificing their independ-
ence and becoming wage or alaryearners.
The sole compensation offered them for
the lowering of their social standing-
quite apart from their lower income-is
the promise of postwar restitution of their
former position. It is here that we once
again come up against the spiritual at-
titude. Modem war demands from the
working individual sacrifices which go
far beyond anything known during the
wars of the last hundred years. We shall
see later that the compensation for work
may scarcely surpll88 the minimum re-
quirements for maintaining the strength
nece sary for work. Hence it is nothing
but moral forces which determine the
quantity and quality of production. This
is one of the strong POinl8 of such nations
as Germany and Japan and a notable
weaknes.s of the United States.
BRAINS REPLACE RAW MATERIAL
The degree of personal obligation and
tho centralization of labor control are
greater than during the first world war
and may be regarded M especially char-
acteristic of total war. In contrast to
this, the nationalization of raw materials
is nothing new. The confiscation of food-
stuffs is an age-old characteristic of war,
and the requisitioning of raw materials iR
known to us from the Great War, although
better preparation and ndminil:!tration are
typical of total war. Of course, those
countries bitherto poor in raw materials
have a bead start, because this lack
forced them to budget and allowed them
to accumulate administrative experience.
Thus the question of raw materials
turns out to be a question of human
quality: what is needed is talent for
organization, inventive power, reliability,
and adaptability. Without these, the
raw-material wealth of America, of south-
eastern Asia, or of Russia is worthless.
We might even go so far as to say that
modern war no longer deserves the term
of "war of raw material." Every child
knows that a lot of raw material is re-
quired. The possibilities of obtaining the
raw material, however, are, as a result of
the progress of chemistry, less dependent
on geography than formerly and have
increased to such an extent that man
once again occupies the foreground. A
shortage of natural mineral oil is no more
of a disaster to the Axis powers than is
the shortage of natural rubber to the
Americans. Invent, inventr-that is the
modem problem of material.
REVERSED TREND
The fact that the question of material
hM changed in appearance was already
to be seen in the period of peace between
the two world wars. At that time the
problems of overproduction appeared
probably for the first time in the history
of mankind with such gravity. One need
only recall the overproduction of shoos
in the nited States which went far be-
yond any possible consumption. Here,
in the case of too much, the arne urge
for government control arose as in the
case of too little in the Great War. The
art of government control is in the process
of becoming a science of its own, whose
chief problem is the proper utilization of
free initiative. If the human forces hid-
ing behind soU-interest in the shape of
per onal talent, personal ambition, ambi-
tion for one's family, are eliminated, then
the economy of a nation is robbed of
incalculable assets.
In Germany a tendency ha.s been dis-
cernible ince 1942 to revert control from
the state to economic groups. Theile
groups are given free rein to u e their
expert knowledge of onditions to guar-
antee certain quota.s of production. A
similar trend has been noticeable in
Japan, too, since the beginning of 1943.
Here the main controlling bodies have in
some ca.sos been accorded supreme au-
thority, as, for instance, in the distribution
of railway discounts by the mining-control
body, or in deciding over applications of
one factory for the use of patents belong-
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ing to a.nother in the interest of national
defense.
The question of material has retreated
behind the question of human qualities.
one of which is also the art of directing
communications. But the question of
material is independent of t,he problem
of financing. to which we shall now turn.
WJUT IS ~ATIONAL INCO~lE?
While the procuring of ruw material
ia a technical problem' whi 'h by far
outweighs the que tion of co t, the pro-
curing of money in a modern war is no
longer a technical but an economic prob-
10m. The experiences of the Great War
have taught us thlLt the question of co t
in this case is a very importa.nt one. In
other words, the procuring of money must
not become too expensive to the state.
In order to mak the importance of
this deci. ive point clear, we shall have to
discuss national income as such. As-
suming that the country has a national
income f say 50 billion dollars in a given
year, what does this national income rep-
resent? n.turally, we must over implify
the pictur '. \\'e 8hall sturt with the
productiun of the individual worker. He
produce something that represents a
certain value in money as pointed out
earlier in this art·icle. The value of an
hour of his working time depends on tho
goods he produces. If the labor of an
entire national economy ia effectively
employed, the value of the goods produced
by an hour of work is high; in tho case
of inefficient organization it is low. The
intelligence of the engineer and the mer-
chant i8 the multiplicator for the laborer's
working hour. If we as 'ume the value
of the product of one working hour to be
ay one doUar, a 10-hour working day
would repre ent 10 doUars and 25 working
days a month 250 doUars. Part of this
amount goes to the worker lLS wages; the
rest is distributed over raw materia.l ,
technical and busin management, or-
ganization, and interest.
The quantity of available working
hours is the fundamental item in calculat-
ing a national income. To continue
\lith oversimplified figures: if in our
country X there are 10 million industrial
workers, 3,000 working hours per annum
per worker would give U8 30 billion work-
ing hours. If the working hour yields
one doUar, th share of industry in the
national income amounts to 30 billion
doUars. The remaining 20 billion doUars
are produced by agriculture. This figure
is lower although the number of w rkers
employed is larger than in industry, for
the yield of each working hour is smaller.
The distribution of the work over
the year is unfavorable, a.nd the number
of working hours in agriculture com-
para.tively low. All this is, of course,
only a very rough approximation; for in
our calculation the work of the family,
especially of the housewife, cannot be
taken into account.
THREATENED STABILITY
In calculating the nationa.l income, we
assume that in the course of the whole
year the one dollar will always have the
same value. Now we must ask: what
are the conditions under which thifl value
remains constant? The theory of money
teaches us that the value of money. or
rather of the monetary unit-regardle88
of whether it is of gold or paper--<lepends
on the relationship between the total
quantity of goods and the tot.'l.l quantity
of money within the territory in which
the currency is valid. Thus, in order to
retain the stability of the currency, the
relationship between the quantity of
goods and the quantity of money must
be kept stable. To return to our
example: one dollar retains its value if,
with a national income of 50 billion dol-
lars, there are also 50 billion dollars'
worth of goods produced in that yenr.
Although in war tinlO these 50 hilli n
dollars arc actually earned and the
goods a1l>o produced, the people are not
able to buy 50 billion dollars' worth of
goods. '" hat could I do with one of the
searchlights produced by our bi 'ycle-
lamp manufactur r, even if I were able
to buy it? Thus we arc faced by the
situation that, although 50 billion dollars
are earned. say 20 billion doUars' worth
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of the goods produced calillot be bought.
As a result, the purchasing power of th.ese
unemployed 20 billion dollar. scrambles
for the remaining purchasable goods to
the value of 30 bilUon dollars. Thus the
equilibrium is disturbed: 50 billion dol-
lars purcha 'ing power. and only 30 billion
dollars' worth of goods. On top of all
this, the quantity of goods is even more
restricted by the above-mentioned regula-
tion of the supply of raw material. The
50 billion dollars of income exert a ter-
rific pressure on the value of the few
purchasable goods and force up prices.
This is the problem of war financing,
which npplies with equnl ruthlessnes to
all countries.
REMOVING SURPLUS PUlICHASING POWER
In attempting to remo\'e this pre ure,
the authorities Rpeak of "skimming off
purchasing power." There are only two
possible ways: either an immediate re-
moval of this surphlR of purchasing power,
or the diverting of tltis purchw ing power
into ll. cn,nal leacling into the future. The
first consil'ts of taxeR. tho 'econd of loans.
Taxes rndically remove purcha.sing power.
They demand from the worker the clear
realization: I work. bu t I cannot buy
goods for my own requirements from my
pay: instead I buy arms and donate them
to my country. Because of England's
extreme clearness of thought in monetary
matters, this country was aule during
the Great War to levy taxes from its
citizens which covered 50 per cent of the
cost of the war. In Germany it wafl only
possible to cover 25 per cent. In t,he
present war, NI\tional-. ocialism has
Hucceeded in almost achieving Englano's
rate. Jndeed, in some ('ll'-;CS it wal> pos-
sible to finance even more than 50 per
cent of the Will' costs by taxation.
II taxe. nre raised beyond thi level.
the present limit to human willingness for
sacrifice is apparently exceeded. The
individual always needs certain reserves
of money beyond the bare requirements
of existence. Hence the governments
say to their subjects: 'Give us the other
50 per cent we require for financing the
war on credit; we will pay you back the
money in 12 or 15 or 17 years. After
the war we shall see to it that it will
not be you who will have to provide for
the intere~t on this money by taxes but
that the beaten enemy will pay this in-
terest. Thus it is in vour own financial
interest to win the \HI;·.·'
WAR LOANS AND THEIR OANGERS
There are many different types of prop-
aganda for these loans and Il1f.Uly elif-
ferent facilities; but the meaning. from
IlU economic point of "iew, is always the
same: burdening the future. It is im-
portant to keep this burden as light as
po. sible. There are three dangers to be
considered here :
(1) Nonpayment of tclxes and loans.
(2) Granting of excessive prices for
armaments on the part of the
state.
(3) Competition in the construction of
new plants.
(I) If the individual docs not pay taxes
or take out louns bill, remains in the
market with his mone". he increa.<;es the
pres. lITe of the quantity of money on the
limited q un,ntity of good'. Through
many thou ands of minute channels the
general price le\"'el is then raised. This
rise can only be postponed. but not done
away with, by the subsidizing of produc-
tionH whose cost is rising. As a result of
the increa.<;e in prices. the inherent value
of the loans so far subscribed sinks, which
does not encoUl'.l,gc the folubscriber. The
situatioll of tho e who hlwe g, firm income
worsens, and finally wages are foreeel
upward. The following year the national
income htL' increaRed. for the yield of one
working hour has risen frOll1 one dollar
to one dollar twenty. Perhaps part of
this incl'ea.se represents real goods; but
the major part is only the inflated mone-
tary ex pre.Qsion of an uncha.nged pro-
duction.
In the latter case, the whole picture of
economics that can be expresi:led in
moncy becomes more and mor distortcd.
Rents rem!lin wlChanged, bread and rice
remain chea.p; but all other prices that
canuot be fixed are increased. Of course,
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there is no dHIerence in the way a can-
non shoots whether it has cost 100,000
dollars or 120,000 dollars. Production
is absolutely unaffected by questions of
money: labor and material are on an
entirely different plane in a total war.
The price figures only take on im portance
at the time of demobilization-but, after
all. it is for postwar times that war is
being waged. For that reason we shall
have later on to go into the time after
the war.
It might be suggested that, if it is a
matter of keeping only so much money
in circulation as corresponds to the value
of available purchasable goods, the gov-
ernment could force people to subscribe
to loans. The result of such a measure,
however, is usually a devaluation of the
loans. The appeal to the individual's
",ens of duty, even in the form of moral
pre.<;sure. has proved more favorable to
the market value of the loans, whose
transferability can, moreover, be slightly
reduced by compulsory registration of
large transfers.
INTERNAL COMPETITION
(2) The danger that the value of each
workiJlg hour be inflated can ve pre\'ented
by seeing to it that the state does not
pay too much for its armament supplies.
For tili' reason the price calculation for
government orders is subject everywhere
to strict control. But a there is usually
an urgent demand on all sides, so that
supplies are always slightly behind the
demand, the individual officcr placing an
order may sometimes grant higher prices
in order to get an earlier deli very, per-
hapl:! earlicr than one of his colleagues.
Thanks to her political leadership, Ger-
many has achieved an unprecedentedly
low quota. of increase in prices.
(:l) Money is required for the payment
of taxes and for subscribing to loans; but
the money market hOllses yet a third
guest. Side by Rioe with the state stands
the entrepreneur, who does not manu-
facture war material but builds plants
in which war material can be produced.
Thus, in addition to the 20 billion dollars
required for war-material production, our
country has also to provide a large
amount, say 5 billion dollars, for ex-
panding its industrial capacity. so that
actually a total amount of 25 billion
dollars must be provided by the popula-
tion through savings.
SAVINGS AND PRIVATIONS
A huge savings program of this kind
cannot be carried out without organiza-
tion. The state must- unite all banks and
financial organizations into a tinance-
control body and exert a planned control
of investments in industrial expansion
and national loans. So we see that, side
by side with control of the labor market
and of ra\v-material supplies, there must
in total war necessarily also be control of
invef,"ltments. Germany has been a pio-
neer in all such matters and is ahead of
other countries in experience.
In our country X. 25 billion dollars are
thus diverted-skimmed off from the
nationa.l income of 50 billion dollars, and
prices should remain stable if the remain-
ing purchasing power of 2£j billion dollars
were balanced by available goods of the
same value. One might say that. with
2;) billion dollars for consumption out of
.50 billion dollars income, the individual
would be able to consume 50 per cent of
his earnings. But this is not true, for
he must pay additional taxes which the
state requires for other than armament
expenditure and which must be deducted
from this 50 per cent. Although the
small consumer d(les not have to bear
the same proportion uf taxes and loans
as tho armaments manufacturer and his
employees, total war does not leave him
much more for his individual consumption
than what is absolutely necessary for
maintaining existence--ncithcr in Ger-
many nor .Japan, neither in Russia nor
England. Beside this bare maintenance
of existence, the reward for his work is
the knowledge of having done everything
humanly possible for the future of his
children.
POSTWA.R PROBLEMS
After the war, the country will have a.
vast heavy industry, airplane, shipbuild-
THE XXtob CENTURY
Now comes the final astounding con-
clusion: that country which emerges from
the war with the smallest amount of war
loans round its neck has, from an eco-
nomic point of view, been most successful.
For, no matter what shape its currency
takes on, its budget remains least bur-
dened of all, and its funds can serve
other purposes, whether it be the provid-
ing of employment, the furthering of
foreign trade, or the carrying out of
cultural tasks. A country with heavy
national debts easily gets caught in the
mill of devaluations in which France, for
instance, gambled away her war gains of
1914/18 by a stupid financial policy.
America, too, is still acting thoughtlessly.
The great race for a sound financial policy
with regard to the future is being rWl
between Germany and England, and
Germany with her scarcely increased price
level is well in the lead.
Let us summarize the characteristics
of the economics of total warfare:
The economic organization represents a
centrally guided economy to an un-
precedented extent. A reversed trend is
already discernible in that the govern-
ments are once again resorting to the
sense of duty of private business groups.
Labor is not only regulatod as a market
but has become a national duty in the
public interest. In addition to this,
labor has been rationalized to such an
extent that plauts of a low degree of
effectiveness are being shut down in favor
of those with a higher ono. As a result
of technical developments, the question
of qua.ntity has become one of quality.
FinllJlcing is no longer a. technical
question, as ca.n be seeu from tho dis-
appearance of the gold problem. (Not
only Japan is closing down hor gold mines
but also America.) The quantity of
money is no longer a. problem: it is only
a question of employing money economi-
cally.
lng, and automobile industry, machine
factories, and plants for the manufacture
of substitutes. Tbey cannot be left to
themselves. A central, organizing hand
must guide their adjustment to the manu-
facture of consumers' goods. The sol-
diers, too, mu t be employed in such jobs
as are most urgently required for recon-
struction a.nd for which the necessary
raw material is available. Thus cen-
tralized economics brought about by
total war wiII not disappear so rapidJy.
Without the neces ary guidance, many
armament firms would collapse. The
prices for all war-essentiul goods would
drop, and this would be compensated
only for a short time by a great demand
for consumers' goods, which would there-
fore soar in price. This boom would
800n die down, and then the problem
would be to prevent the general price
level from sinking. For if it sinks, the
burden of the war loans gains corre-
spondingly in weight.
Of course, that country can most easily
avoid price collapses which has prevented
prices from rising during the war. After
the Creat War, it was one of the chronic
ailments of all participating countries
that the war loans, which had been sub-
scribed with money of very low purcha ing
power, suddenly represented double or
treble their former value in purchasing
poweJ'. The interest on 100 billions in
any currency can easily be paid if the
national budget amounts to 30 billions; at
3 per cent the interest amounts to 3
billions, i.e., little more than 10 per cent
of the budget. But the Imme interest
becomes an intolerable nightmare when
the budget drops to 10 billions lUI a re-
sult of the general decline in prices and
33 per cent of the budget now has to go
to the payment of interest. Even Eng-
land, with all her financial acumen,
was unable after 1918 to find a feasible
way of reducing this burden, and the
path of hesitation finally led to devalua-
tion.
• • •
